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The Space Commerce Corporation of the 
U.S. and Technopribor of the Soviet Union 
have agreed to develop jointly and market a 
new commercial mobile launch vehicle derived 
from Soviet SS-20 medium-range missile 
technology. 
The Soviets have indicated they could 
produce 300 launchers within a five-year 
pe riod follow ing a go-ahead deci sion. The 
launcher could be employed for commercial 
payloads or scientific research, including 
materials processing experiments. 
President Gorbachev reiterated in his 
speech at Stanford University on June 4, 1990 
the commitment of the Soviet Union to convert 
military armaments to peaceful commercial 
purposes. He recognized the requirement to 
develop international legal safeguards 
against potential mil itary use evol ving from 
converted armaments. The Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency is likewise concerned with 
the START vehicle and these issues w ill need 
to be resol ved. 
In addition to the development of a 
small relocatable launch vehicle there are 
opportuni ties to have accommodation payloads 
placed aboard other Soviet launch vehicles. 
In November, 1989 Energetics Satellite 
Corporation placed an order for $54M. Their 
SAT/TRAC satellites will be placed into 
geosynchronous orbit by Proton launchers. 
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THE START LAUNCHER 
The Space Commerce Corporation and Technopribor of the 
Soviet Union signed an agreement in Moscow on October 11, 1989. 
The Memorandum of Understanding established the working 
relationship between The Space Commerce Corporation and 
Technopr ibor to develop and market a new small launcher to be 
named START. 
Technopr ibor is anew ly formed organiz ation that control s 
the SS-20 mil itary production complex. The joint proj ect would 
allow the Soviet Union to transition its SS-20 production 
facilities and work force into commercial activities. It will 
utilize technology, systems and manufacturing complexes that are 
not required to be destroyed under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
forces (INF) treaty. 
Label ed the "Conversion One Proj ect" by the Sov iets, START 
could become the first step in the practical implementation of a 
long-term process. Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, has 
directed the transformation of the nation's military-industrial 
complex into commercial activities. 
START will be a newly designed vehicle. It will not 
incorporate parts of existing SS-20 missiles which have been 
destroyed under the INF treaty. However, former SS-20 production 
facilities in the Soviet Union will be used to build the new 
launchers. Components developed for the SS-20 may also be 
utilized. The SS-20's guidance system may be upgraded and 
reprogrammed, for example, into an orbital guidance system. 
The faring size will be approximately l800cm by 1300cm 
narrowing to 800cm. The three-stage, solid fuel launcher will be 
capable of carrying, for example, a 350 kg payload into a 400 km 
orbit at 30 degrees inclination. According to preliminary 
specifications, START will weigh 40-45 metriC tons and will have 
an overall length of 20 meters, making it sl ightly larger than 
the two-stage, 16.49 meter SS-20. 
As with the SS-20, the START booster will be mounted on a 
mobile transporter/launcher vehicle, enabl ing it to be launched 
from a variety of sites without special launching padS. The 
significance is that the launch vehicle can be brought to the 
satellite and not vice versa as is the current practice. It 
would also enable launches from locations that currently do not 
have established launch complexes. Being able to "relocate" the 
launching site enables the mission planner to achieve a 
particular orbit giving due consideration to safety and cost. 
MARKET ANALYSIS 
Estimated costs will be $10,000-16,000 per payload lb., or 
$4-5 million per launch. START would compete for low Earth orbit 
commercial payloads with the other small launch vehicles. 
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To determine the commercial profitability of the START 
launcher, SCC conducted a market analysis including an extensive 
survey of prospective experimenters and research organizations. 
Our census of experimenters identified 332 separate payloads 
that, if funded, could be ready to fly in the 1990s. About 20% 
of these are payloads f rom foreign organizations, pr imar ily in 
Canada and Europe. About 30% are payloads sponsored by various 
U. S. domestic and mil i tary programs. The remaining 50% are 
sponsored by U.S. civilian government agencies or private 
resources. 
Some of these pay loads are pI anned as fully integr ated 
spacecraft that would require only launch servlces. Most, 
however, are just an experimental apparatus that must rely on 
support subsystems suppl ied by the launch service or some third 
party. It may be necessary to design and supply a standard 
spacecraft buss structure including power and other subsystems in 
order to sell START launches to these potential customers. 
Many of the experiments included in our customer survey will 
require mul tiple flights to complete their research work. 
Including these reflight requirements, the payloads that we have 
identified total about 600 n fl igh t needs n dur ing the 1990 s. 
However, because several experiments typically share a single 
spacecraft bus, this assessment of nflight needs" does not 
translate to a specific number of launches. 
U. S. domestic payloads users were surveyed in more detail 
because they represent the majority of all small commercial 
payloads which could be launched into outer space by the START 
vehicle during the 1990s. A sample of these U.S. domestic 
payloads surveyed indicates that the two scientific research 
areas with the largest number of identified experiments are: 
1. basic physics and astronomy (sponsorship shared by the 
U.S. military and civilian (NASA) space programs); and 
2. microgravity/materials processing basic research 
(primarily supported in the U.S. by the center for the 
Commercial Development of Space). 
Figure 1 shows the resul ts of a survey of potential START 
customers by broad scientific areas for U. S. domestic payloads. 
It is important to note that the communications segment 
represents only identified appl ications for technology which is 
already been demonstrated to work. Research programs supporting 
the communications area, such as atmosphere effects on signal 
propagation, are counted as physic experiments. 
WHO PAYS FOR THE LAUNCH 
Considering hardware development costs for U. S. domestic 
users only, which we estimate to be about 80% of the entire START 
commercial market dur ing the 1990s, approximately 60% of these 
payloads are built entirely or partially by u.s. civilian 
government agencies. The U. S. Department of Defense sponsors 
another 35% of these payloads. Thus, hardware development funded 
exclusively by private capital make up less than 5% of the number 
of experiments surveyed. However, private funding also 
participates in cosponsor ing an addi tional 5% of the payloads 
with the civilian government program (NASA). Thus, private 
capi tal appears to be invol ved in building only about 10% of the 
payloads SCC has identified in this study. 
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of this funding for U.S. 
domestic payloads. These statistics reflect the number of 
payloads, and hence the number of launches that could be 
anticipated on the START launch vehicle. They do not reflect the 
dollar investment by any of the sponsors. This becomes 
especially important when "in-kind" support and facility sharing 
arrangements by industry and goverrunent are taken into account. 
This type of sharing arrangement is not included in our analysis. 
It is clear, therefore, that the vast majority of all u.S. 
domestic payloads are buil t using goverrunent funds. Therefore, 
in order to be commercially successful, the START project must be 
able to launch U.S. domestic payloads. SCC reached this 
conclusion and as a resul t, expanded the scope of the 
international marketing study to include an analysis of the U. S. 
legal and regulatory regime controlling: 
1. the use of the START launch vehicle in the Uni ted 
States for U.S. domestic payloads; and 
2. the use of the START launch vehicle from launch si tes 
outside the United States with payloads, or payloads 
containing U.S. components. 
HOW MANY ACTUAL FLIGHTS 
Although the SCC survey found over 300 potential payloads 
for the START launch vehicle, our assessment indicates that, at 
current price levels, only 15% - 20% of these can be expected to 
reach active flight ready status, given current program plans and 
funding support. This estimate is partially confirmed by survey 
responses that 59 payloads (18%) are now manifested. These small 
payloads can be carried both on expendable launch vehicles, and 
as secondary payloads on the Space Shuttle. 
It is important to remember that as a salesman must make 
many contacts to sell to a few customers, so also do ideas for 
experiments in space become a smaller number of actual launches 
which could be accompl ished by START. 
ACCOMMODATION PAYLOADS 
The potential START launcher is only one method of getting 
your small satellite into space. The Energetics Satellite 
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Corporation of Englewood, Colorado signed a contract with SCC in 
November, 1989. The SAT/TRAC satellites will be part of the 
SAT/TRAC Geolocation system. The technology, al though novel in 
concept and application, utilizes predominately noff-the-shelf n 
components to generate position information and relay the data to 
users. The system's major components consist of a simple relay 
type satellite, a ground-based computer processing and data 
distribution center and numerous end user transponders. 
Transponders attached to or carried by any vehicle, object or 
individual can be located within 50 feet. 
The contract provides prices for launching up to eight 
satellites on the Proton launch vehicle. The reason for the low 
price of $54M for the entire constellation is because they will 
be accommodation launches. The 480 pound satellites will be put 
into geosynchronous orbit in pairs. They will npiggy backn on 
one of the ten to twelve Proton launches the U. S. S. R. util izes 
each year to boost its own communications satellites into GEO. 
The cost to the Sov iet Union is nominal. The only cost in 
real ity is the integration and mating of the satellite to the 
rocket. Preliminary quotes from the insurance industry are 12% 
for the Proton vs. 16-18% for other large launchers. 
Another alternative for satellite owners is to place several 
satellites on a launch vehicle such as the Cyclone to go into low 
Earth orbit. For instance, it can place 4000 kg into a 200 km by 
70 degree incl ination. The faring size of the Cyclone is 2300cm 
by 5900cm. It can be launched for $15M, depending upon the 
services required by the customer. As of April 1, 1989 there 
have been 73 successful launches out of 75 attempted. 
POLICY ISSUES 
SCC has al ready discussed and will continue to di scuss the 
legal ramifications of the proj ect with the U. S. State 
Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, On-Site 
Inspection Agency and other interested government agencies. For 
the project to move forward, the possible conflicts with the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty will have to be 
resol ved. 
Soviet officials noted that the conversion process would 
require the developnent of administrative and legal tools and 
safeguards to ensure against possible military use both actual 
and perceived. The Soviets have indicated that START tacilities 
woul d be open to inspection. 
Technopribor will provide Space Commerce Corporation with a 
detailed technical description of the START mobile launch vehicle 
complex within 90 days of a decision to proceed. Each launch 
compl ex consists of a launch vehicl e, a launcher container, 
transporter and support equipment. Design work on the launcher 
will be completed in six to nine eighteen months after starting. 
When decision is made to proceed with the project, flight 
testing of the launcher would begin approximately one year. Ten 
test launches are tentatively planned to be conducted in the 
Soviet Union as well as other sites around the globe. We would 
I ike to conduct some of the test launches f rom Canada, Austral ia 
and Brazil. We will also seek Department of Transportation 
approval to conduct a test launch in the U.S. 
As this paper is being written, the new space launch policy 
of the Bush Administration has not been released by the National 
Space Council. However, the prel iminary indication is that the 
appl ication to the Department of State by Uni ted Technologies 
Corporation to work with the Cape York Space Agency and the 
Soviets in Australia will be approved. 
This is the first break in the U.S. policy against 
permitting American satellites to utilize Soviet launchers. The 
policy issue appears to be two aspects of technology transfer. 
The initial concern was that the Soviets might learn valuable 
secrets from being near a satellite buil t in the U. S. (The 
Administration apparently believes the PRC is not as capable of 
discovering these secrets.) 
The corollary concern of the government is the possibility 
of the proliferation of launch technology to nations that 
cur rently do not possess such information. If these are, in 
fact, the concerns of the Bush Administration and not merely 
protection of the U.S. launch industry, the START launcher could 
be utilized countries possessing launch technology. 
In the past the primary impediment to using Soviet launch 
vehicles has been the U.S. policy preventing export of satellites 
manufactured in the U. S. The vehicle for implementing this 
pol icy has been the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. 
The ITAR defines all satellites as munitions. This subjects them 
to the scrutiny of war materials whose export is governed by the 
Arms Control Act. 
The applicability of these rules to an export application 
for a satellite with open technology has not been tested. If the 
design of a satellite has been publ ished in open literature and 
the information is available to the public (except for applicable 
copyright protection), the technology transfer argument would 
fade away like the grin on the Cheshire cat. 
CONCLUSION 
In this time of changing policies the satellite builder and 
operator should keep the options open, both in design criteria 
and desired launch service provider. The one thing certain about 
U.S. government policy is that it will change. The adroit space 
operator will be prepared to seize opportunities as they arise. 
-
-
. } 
EARTH OBSERVATION 
__ J 
MICROGRAVITY. 
MATERIALS PROCESSING 
'" 
• - INCLUDES ONLY DOMESTIC CIVILIAN AND DOD PAYLOADS FOR WHICH 
UNAMBIGUOUS SAMPLE DATA WAS AVAILABLE (163 PAYLOADS) 
/LiFE SCIENCES 
PHYSICS & ASTRONOMY 
FIGURE 1 Survey Results by Discipline Area 
) 
OOD 
~ 
/ 
PRIVATE I 
TBD 
) ) ) 
{ 
WITHOOD 
CIVILIAN MENT WITH FOREIGN GOVER  
WITH OTHER WITH INDUSTRV ~ 
CONTRIBUTOR ~ ~ 
....... ~ 
CIVILIAN 
GOVERNMENT 
ONLY CIVILIAN 
GOVERNMENT 
FUNDING 
u.s. DOMESTIC PAYLOADS ONLY 1-- . ~-- ----- -. 
FIGURE 2: Who Pays to Develop Hardware 
J . J J } 
